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ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDOs Collateralised debt obligations
CDS Credit default swaps
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DGSyFP Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds
DIs Deposit institutions
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EU European Union
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial Vehicle Corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GI Gross income
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
LGD Loss given default
m Millions
MEFF Mercado Español de Futuros y Opciones (Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NOI Net operating income
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price-earnings ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
* The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of the 
 Financial Stability Report.
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Overview
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), and particularly since the sum-
mer this year, new factors of risk and uncertainty have arisen in the international financial sec-
tor. There has been considerable turbulence on financial markets, the source of which lies in 
the increase in defaults on US sub-prime mortgages. Although the size of this business seg-
ment is small (it accounts for 5.3% of banking assets in the United States, with defaults affect-
ing less than 1% of such assets), the financing of this type of mortgage through complex 
structured products, which diversify risk among many agents but make the valuation thereof 
very complicated, has led the episode to spread to other financial markets and take on an in-
ternational dimension, essentially affecting other, similarly developed countries. As a result, li-
quidity has contracted strongly on the markets, leading to the need for intervention by various 
central banks. And, at the same time, there has been a reappraisal of risk and less appetite to 
bear it on certain markets, a matter which might continue affecting confidence about the 
above-mentioned markets in the coming months.
Admittedly, this bout of turbulence may contribute to a normalisation of the low risk premia 
prevailing until recently. But it also entails greater uncertainty as regards world economic 
growth, especially if the US mortgage market crisis ultimately affects the US economy ad-
versely or if the extension over time of financial turbulence alters the cost and availability of 
private sector financing. These risk factors compound those already mentioned in previous 
FSRs, and in particular those relating to global imbalances and to the rise in oil and com-
modities prices.
In any event, the current financial turbulence has come about at a time of strong world eco-
nomic growth in which households, companies and financial institutions are generally display-
ing a sound financial position. There are essentially two channels through which the Spanish 
economy might be affected by this bout of instability: that relating to the external sector, inso-
far as our export markets may be affected; and that linked to financing conditions in the private 
sector. As regards the latter, it should be stressed that the financial position of Spanish de-
posit institutions is sound, and that should contribute to mitigating potentially adverse fac-
tors.
Over the course of recent years, the growth rate of financing granted to the private sector by 
Spanish deposit institutions has been strong. Recent trends, however, confirm what was re-
ported in the previous FSR, namely that there has been a slowdown in credit to the resident 
private sector. The growth rate of credit to households has eased, as has, for the first time in 
recent years, credit to corporations. The slowdown in corporate credit is concentrated in the 
construction and property development sectors. Accordingly, although the growth rate of 
credit to the real estate sector remains high, changes are beginning to be perceptible at de-
posit institutions in the form of a greater diversification of their credit portfolios, with a signifi-
cant increase in credit to industrial and services corporations not linked to the real estate 
sector.
In line with what was highlighted in the previous FSR, the normalisation of doubtful assets 
continues, moving towards the levels of doubtful assets ratios observed in other developed 
countries. However, this is largely in response to the strong growth of credit in recent years, 
given that there is a natural lag between credit expansion and the emergence of default prob-
lems. Further, the changes to accounting rules have also had a bearing on the higher growth 
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of doubtful assets, inasmuch as the latter have to be recognised much earlier and in a higher 
proportion. In any event, current doubtful assets ratios are very low, both when observed from 
a historical perspective and when compared with those in other developed countries. It should 
not be surprising, then, if further increases in doubtful assets ratios continue to be seen in the 
coming months.
In Spain there is no mortgage market segment comparable to the US sub-prime sector. What 
is more, Spanish institutions have virtually no direct exposure to the sub-prime market in the 
United States, and nor do they have any other type of investment tied to this business seg-
ment which, indirectly, might adversely affect them. The doubtful assets ratio for the US sub-
prime segment currently stands at around 15%. Comparatively, at the height of the last reces-
sion in the Spanish economy 14 years back, characterised by a very high unemployment rate, 
a high budget deficit and a negative GDP growth rate (all of which circumstances are far re-
moved not only from the current conditions in the Spanish economy but also from the worst 
conceivable scenario at present), defaults on individual mortgage loans did not exceed 4%; 
indeed, the attendant ratio in June 2007 stood at 0.5%.
The sharp growth in credit recorded in Spain in recent years has not been accompanied by a 
commensurate increase in deposits raised from customers, which is why Spanish institutions 
have resorted to the wholesale markets to raise financing. Asset securitisation has been one 
of the mechanisms used in this connection. Asset securitisation processes in Spain differ to a 
large extent from those pursued by entities in other countries, and there are several reasons 
for this. First, Spanish institutions have developed relatively simple securitisation structures; 
they have not seen securitisation as a business in itself but as an opportunity to obtain addi-
tional liquidity, and there are no incentives to grant credit on less exacting terms. Further, the 
quality of mortgage-backed assets is very high (low mortgage default, even in highly unfavour-
able economic circumstances, very low levels of actual losses in the event of default, substan-
tial credit enhancements, etc.).
The policy of resorting to wholesale markets in search of financing, a matter identified in previ-
ous FSRs as a factor requiring proper management by Spanish institutions, may be on the 
wane insofar as credit is perceptibly slowing and the raising of deposits is more buoyant than 
in previous years. Institutions’ liquidity position is thus trending favourably, while their short 
interbank position has diminished. Furthermore, the banking model in Spain, predominantly 
one of traditional retail banks with an extensive branch network, in which contact with custom-
ers is very close, may contribute to bringing about a replacement of financing from wholesale 
markets with customer deposits.
Despite a more uncertain international environment and the current circumstances on financial 
markets, Spanish deposit institutions are favourably placed to address the situation appropri-
ately. This is thanks both to their business model, which depends less on obtaining revenue 
via the financial markets and which is unconnected to the risks arising from the US sub-prime 
mortgage market, and to their financial strength.
This financial strength can primarily be seen in the income statement, the first line of defence 
against potential difficulties. The favourable trend of the various operating margins and of effi-
ciency is perceptible in a generalised improvement in returns, both on assets and on equity, to 
June 2007. Secondly, the solvency of Spanish deposit institutions stands comfortably above 
the regulatory minimum levels, in terms both of the total solvency ratio and the tier 1 ratio. Fi-
nally, Spanish regulations on coverage of doubtful assets with provisions for bad debts offer 
further, counter-cyclical factors of strength.
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Insurance companies, which are less exposed to the current financial difficulties, are also dem-
onstrating notable soundness, along with a favourable business performance. That does not 
mean that, as with other financial market participants such as pension and mutual funds, they 
are exempt from risks that will need to be properly managed. Such risks include longevity, 
without ruling out — especially for pension and mutual funds — risks related to the very course 
financial markets take. In this respect, private equity activities, which have expanded strongly 
in recent times, may be adversely affected owing to existing liquidity pressures and to a reap-
praisal of the level of risk incurred by investors in such activities.
Finally, and in the light of the recent bouts of financial turbulence, this FSR analyses the impor-
tance of central banks’ collateral policy. It argues that an effectively and constantly extensive 
system offers advantages over a more restrictive one, these advantages being particularly tell-
ing in situations of tight liquidity on interbank markets.
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1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Developments in the international financial markets in recent months have been shaped by a 
bout of turbulence triggered last summer by the increase in defaults on sub-prime mortgage 
loans in the US1. The exposure of the US financial system to these loans is limited (sub-prime 
lending represents from 10% to 15% of outstanding mortgages), so it only affects the sol-
vency of a small number of institutions specialised in these markets. However, the process that 
has characterised the funding of these loans, in which the institutions originating them spread 
the risk via structured products, along with the complexity, size and popularity attained by 
these products in recent years, have caused the crisis to spill over into other markets and take 
on a worldwide dimension. Thus the deterioration in the quality of sub-prime loans was ulti-
mately reflected in a widening of the risk premia on the products associated with them and in 
a contraction of liquidity in the secondary markets where they are traded. The lower demand 
for these instruments, partly due to the uncertainty about the size and distribution of the 
losses incurred on these complex, hard-to-value products, gave rise to problems in the refi-
nancing of certain vehicles, obliging certain financial institutions to supply funds to these inter-
mediaries. Such vehicles, counduits and SIVs invest long-term in diverse assets and are fi-
nanced through short-term notes collateralised by securitisations (asset-backed commercial 
paper - ABCP). Unlike SIVs, conduits normally have liquidity lines from the banks that sponsor 
them. Spanish banks have not used this type of off-balance-sheet bank conduit or vehicle, 
unlike US banks and numerous European banks which have resorted to them, sometimes for 
highly significant amounts.
The greater need for liquidity generated tensions in money markets and led certain central 
banks to respond by supplying funds on an extraordinary basis. Despite this, the uncertainty 
as to institutions’ exposure to the risks associated with US sub-prime mortgages led to a 
significant increase in depo-repo spreads2 (Chart 1.1.A).
The turbulence has also affected other financial markets. Thus there has been a general 
widening of credit risk premia, most marked in lower quality debt (Chart 1.1.B). Stock mar-
ket indices have fallen, most sharply in the financial and construction sectors, and prices 
have become more volatile (Chart 1.2 A and B). Against this background of heightened 
uncertainty, the preference of certain investors for lower-risk assets increased, and this was 
reflected in falling long-term government debt yields which, in the case of debt issued by 
the US government, dipped below 4.4% for 10-year maturities. In the currency markets, 
the higher volatility was behind the close-out of carry-trade positions3 and a strong appre-
ciation of the currencies on which the financing of these transactions is based (such as the 
Japanese yen), with the consequent depreciation of the currencies receiving the funds. 
However, following the cut of 50 bp in the US Federal Reserve’s official rate on 18 Septem-
ber, there was some correction of these movements. Hence stock market indices recouped 
some of the lost ground, implied volatilities and risk premia fell, government debt yields 
rose and, in the currency markets, some of the incentive for carry-trading returned. Mean-
while, the US dollar, after an initial appreciation, followed a trend of significant depreciation, 
partly explained by the appearance of strong downside expectations in official interest 
rates.
The bout of financial 
turbulence has been 
reflected in notable tension 
in international money 
markets…
… and in other financial 
markets.
1. For more details of the origin and course of the crisis, see Box 1. 2. Spread between the interest rate on unsecured 
interbank deposits and that on secured interbank deposits. 3. Activity in which very low-cost financing is obtained in 
one currency and invested in assets yielding a higher return in another currency. The carry trader works on the expecta-
tion that the exchange rate will show low volatility or even contribute positively to the total return on the transaction.
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Although there is no exact definition of sub-prime mortgages in the 
United States, this type of loan is generally characterised by the fact 
that it is extended to households with a non-existent or incomplete 
credit record, and with a high risk profile. This market segment grew 
notably between 2003 and 2005 against a background marked by 
strong real estate price rises and by very benign borrowing condi-
tions. A substantial portion of these loans were securitised, meaning 
the attendant risks were distributed to other national and interna-
tional investors, thereby contributing to the expansion of this activity. 
From mid-2005, the default ratio for this type of mortgage began to 
move on a rising course, which worsened as from 2006 (see panel A). 
While the rise in defaults recently is similar to that witnessed between 
2000 and 2002, there are differentiating factors between that period 
and the present one. The aforementioned securitisation of these 
loans has come about under a framework (originate-to-distribute 
model) which has, first, led the loan originator to tend to uncouple it-
self from the financial situation of the borrower. Further, the originate-
to-distribute model has prompted a situation whereby risks are dis-
tributed among a broad set of domestic and international institutions 
in a relatively opaque fashion, partly due to the complexity of the 
process involving the use of sophisticated structured products. From 
the demand standpoint, it should not be forgotten that investors have 
pursued a search-for-yield process during these years, which has 
increased the attractiveness of these products. Finally, and largely as 
a result of the foregoing developments, the volume of the sub-prime 
segment has grown significantly in recent years.
Since early 2007, the deterioration in the quality of these assets has 
been reflected in an increase in the risk premiums on the lowest-rated 
tranches of the securitisations of these loans (see panel B). But, sub-
sequently, negative sentiment spread to the other bonds linked to US 
sub-prime mortgages. This was especially the case when, in mid-
June, Moody’s downgraded the credit ratings of structured products 
that invest in these assets. In early July Standard & Poor’s took similar 
action, which also spread to transactions with CDOs backed by 
these securities. In July and August, news emerged on the first inter-
mediaries affected by the deterioration in this type of loan both in the 
United States and in other areas. The investment bank Bear Stearns 
duly informed its customers on 18 July of the sizeable losses incurred 
in two of the hedge funds managed by it. On 24 July Countrywide 
Financial Corp, one of the main private mortgage securitisation insti-
tutions in the United States, announced the difficulties it was facing 
owing to the decline in its profits, linked to the US real estate crisis. 
And on 30 July, the German investment bank IKB disclosed heavy 
losses linked to these products and announced that its main share-
holder (the entity KfW) was assuming the obligations to supply liquid-
ity to a securitisation vehicle exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage 
market. These developments ultimately affected the demand for as-
set-backed bonds, which appreciably reduced their liquidity. On 9 
August, BNP Paribas temporarily froze redemptions in three invest-
ment funds owing to its difficulties in valuing its portfolio.
The refinancing problems facing certain investment vehicles with ex-
posures to the sub-prime market, which were being funded by 
short-term financing, generated tensions on international money 
markets. That led the ECB to make an exceptional injection of funds 
into the financial system on 9 August, a measure that was also fol-
lowed by other central banks. In the following days, there were fur-
ther interventions aimed at normalising conditions on money mar-
kets. In the case of the US Federal Reserve, the injection was 
accompanied by a 50 bp cut in its discount rate. On 14 September 
the Bank of England extended emergency funding to Northern Rock 
in the light of the liquidity problems facing this entity. Although 
Northern Rock had no risks in the sub-prime segment, its difficulties 
stemmed, at a time of financial market turbulence, from its financing 
structure, in which a very high proportion of funds were from the 
wholesale markets. The following week (18 September) the US Fed-
eral Reserve cut its federal funds target rate and its discount rate by 
50 bp.
In sum, the sub-prime mortgage crisis evidences idiosyncratic fea-
tures that distinguish it from previous episodes. These include most 
notably the slowness with which it has come to light and the fact that 
its has been centred on the industrialised countries’ markets.
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Although the reassessment of risk on credit markets accompanying this bout of turbulence 
calls into play certain positive factors for long-term financial stability, insofar as it involves the 
normalisation of excessively low risk premia and thus raises borrowing costs somewhat, it 
cannot be ruled out that some cost may have to be paid in terms of short- and medium-term 
world economic growth. In any event, it is still too soon to assess the impact of this turbulence, 
since there are not yet any significant data on how the international economy has performed 
after the turbulence. That said, the impact will depend primarily on the final extent of the real 
estate crisis in the US. The forecasts of international organisations are for US GDP to grow in 
2008 at a moderately lower rate than that expected some months ago, although the downside 
risks seem to have risen. Naturally, if these risks were to materialise, the global macroeco-
nomic scene would be seriously affected. Other factors that will shape the behaviour of world 
output are the depth and duration of the financial market turbulence, since these can affect the 
cost and availability of financing to the private sector.
In any event, this episode has occurred at a time when the world economy is growing rapidly 
and, in addition, is characterised by the robustness of the financial position of households, 
firms and financial intermediaries in the major areas, which are factors that strengthen the re-
silience to these shocks. In particular, the high levels of capitalisation of the systemically impor-
tant international financial institutions seem to be sufficient to absorb any losses stemming 
from market developments. Moreover, the buoyancy of the emerging markets, which have 
generally been little affected by this episode, would tend to mitigate the impact of the turbu-
lence. The relatively sound behaviour of the main stock market indices and the high oil and 
commodities prices are consistent with this diagnosis.
In short, all these considerations suggest that in the upcoming quarters the pattern of world 
output should remain buoyant (albeit at a more moderate pace), although the uncertainty sur-
rounding this behaviour has increased and, at the same time, the downside risks have risen. 
The risks stemming from market instability come on top of those already noted in the last FSR, 
such as the persistence of a high external deficit in the US the financing of which requires a 
considerable volume of funds. Although the lower economic buoyancy of the US will help to 
correct this imbalance, the rise in risk premiums will make it more costly to finance. Moreover, 
these factors could weigh on the performance of the US dollar.
The turbulence entails risks 
for world economic 
growth…
… although some factors 
tend to mitigate that risk.
These risks come on top of 
others such as those 
stemming from external 
imbalances and higher oil 
and raw material prices.
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The rise in oil and commodities prices also constitutes a risk factor for international economic 
and financial performance, insofar as it may feed through to heightened inflationary pressure, 
since, in this case, it will reduce the room for manoeuvre of monetary authorities to accom-
modate monetary policy to developments in risks to economic growth.
The Spanish financial system is in a sound financial position to face the turbulence in the 
international financial markets and is underpinned by high profitability, comfortable sol-
vency levels clearly above the minimum regulatory requirements and ample coverage of 
doubtful loans by the provisions accumulated during recent years. Furthermore, the Span-
ish mortgage market lacks the sub-prime segment seen in the US. Hence the credit qual-
The Spanish financial 
system is in a sound 
financial position to face the 
bout of turbulence,
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ity of Spanish assets is high, as evidenced by the low doubtful assets ratios and the moder-
ate loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. In addition, the assets linked to US sub-prime mortgages 
have an extremely marginal weight in the balance sheets of these institutions and their 
exposure via possible lines of credit to other financial intermediaries that invest in such in-
struments is nil. Moreover, the scant financial liquidity on the money market has had a more 
moderate impact in Spain than in other countries because in recent years the institutions 
have been covering most of their funding needs through the issuance of medium- and 
long-term debt.
These developments have come at a time when the Spanish economy continues to exhibit 
considerable buoyancy. Thus in the first half GDP grew at a rate of around or slightly above 4% 
(Chart 1.3.A), with a composition in which the lesser thrust of domestic spending is being 
offset by an improvement in net external demand (Chart 1.3.B). Against this background, one 
of the channels through which the recent turbulence could impact growth prospects is through 
its effect on Spain’s export markets. Another way is through financing conditions for the private 
sector. In this respect, the strong financial position of institutions is a factor that will tend to 
mitigate the impact of the turbulence and so reduce the likelihood of it extending beyond a 
healthy normalisation of risk premia that were at very low levels. The resilience of the Spanish 
economy to this turbulence is also based on the financial soundness of households and firms, 
which is underpinned by high household wealth and the favourable performance of corporate 
profits.
In short, both the Spanish economy and the Spanish financial system are in a favourable posi-
tion to cope with these shocks. However, it is still early to gauge the true intensity and duration 
of this market turbulence and it will be necessary to wait until fuller information is available to 
obtain a more accurate picture. Naturally, if the turbulence ends up substantially affecting the 
US economy, Spain’s main export markets or the international capital markets, it is unlikely that 
the buoyancy of the Spanish economy will be unaffected.
which, along with the 
buoyancy of the Spanish 
economy, provides leeway 
for absorbing the shocks,
although it is still very early 
to gauge the true extent of 
this episode.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
Chapter 1 noted the favourable performance of the world economy and, in particular, that of 
Spain, although the turbulence in international financial markets engendered new uncertainties 
while at the same time confirming some of the risks identified in the last FSR (excess liquidity 
and overly low risk premiums). Despite this, the data for the first half of 2007, which are the 
latest available at the time of this report going to press, confirm the strength of Spanish de-
posit institutions. This chapter analyses those points of strength and identifies certain risks that 
will have to be managed appropriately by institutions.
The consolidated balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions (Table 2.1) show a brisk pace 
of activity in the first half of 2007, with total assets up by 18%. This buoyancy is apparent in 
both business in Spain (20%) and, albeit to a lesser extent, abroad (10.9%). However, it should 
be kept in mind that business abroad was affected by the depreciation against the euro of 
certain currencies of the countries in which Spanish banks have their highest exposures.
The buoyancy of bank balance sheets is largely explained by the behaviour of lending to the 
private sector, which grew somewhat faster than total assets (20.5%). However, credit to the 
private sector shows signs of slowing as rates fall from nearly 25% in June 2006 to slightly 
above 20% in the first half of 2007. This slowdown is concentrated in secured credit (down 
from 27% to 20%).
Against this background of growth in activity, the growth rate of doubtful assets has acceler-
ated from 7.4% in June 2006 to 22.9% in the same period of 2007. This acceleration is shared 
by both business in Spain and that abroad. In any event, the pass-through to the doubtful as-
sets ratio is very limited (increase of 3 bp with respect to the previous year) and, for total busi-
ness, this ratio remained very low (0.65%). Moreover, provisions cover more than twice the 
current volume of doubtful assets and this coverage is even higher in individual balance sheets 
(business in Spain).
Private-sector deposits taken by Spanish institutions have grown (15%) more strongly than in 
the previous year. Nevertheless, their growth rate is slower than that of lending, so Spanish 
institutions have had to raise funds on the wholesale markets, although to a lesser extent than 
in the same period of the previous year. Also, own funds, which held at a relative weight of 
around 5% in bank balance sheets, were expansionary (17.7%), and this strengthened the 
solvency of institutions.
The pick-up in deposits, particularly time deposits, and the slowdown in lending to the private 
sector help to mitigate the loss of relative importance of traditional bank funding. Moreover, 
Spanish institutions, which are highly specialised in retail business and have an extensive 
branch network ensuring a close relationship with customers in both lending and deposit ac-
tivity, depend on the securities market for funding to a similar extent to that observed in sev-
eral other EU countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, and appreciably less 
so than in others like the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and Denmark (Chart 2.1.A)1.
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS
The pace of activity is high, 
although secured lending is 
slowing.
Doubtful assets continue to 
rise, but their effect on 
doubtful assets ratios is very 
moderate.
Deposits are growing more 
rapidly than in the previous 
year…
1. The data were drawn from the ECB publication EU Banking Structures (2005) and used to calculate the ratio of total 
deposits taken from customers other than credit institutions to loans granted to customers other than credit institutions. 
The information is only publicly available for 2005, but the trends observed for 2006 do not show significant changes. 
Individual data.
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The slower growth of assets abroad as compared with the greater buoyancy of business in 
Spain means that the weight of the former in total business has decreased slightly, by 1.3 pp 
to 21.2%. In any event, as noted in previous FSRs, the foreign assets of Spanish deposit insti-
tutions present low levels of risk (Chart 2.1.B).
Since the last FSR, credit to the resident private sector in Spain (Chart 2.2.A) has slowed 
(growth of 25.8% in December 2006, against 22.6% in June 2007) due to the trend in mort-
gage lending (to both households and firms), which had been growing less quickly since 
mid-2006 (27.7% in June 2006, 24.7% in December 2006 and 20.2% in June 2007). In 
terms of net flows (new loans granted less repayments on that already granted), the picture 
… while no significant risks 
associated with the assets 
abroad are discernible.
Lending growth has 
slowed…
ASSETS JUN-07
(% CHANGE)
JUN-07/
JUN-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-07
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 57,800 35.0 1.6 1.8
Loans and advances to credit institutions 280,365 20.5 8.7 8.9
General government 50,035 -1.1 1.9 1.6
Other private sectors 2,085,933 21.0 64.7 66.3
Debt securities 329,633 -1.7 12.6 10.5
Other equity instruments 113,490 35.2 3.1 3.6
Investments 31,651 -0.7 1.2 1.0
Derivatives 87,147 34.9 2.4 2.8
Tangible assets 34,782 -0.8 1.3 1.1
Other (a) 73,488 15.1 2.4 2.3
TOTAL ASSETS 3,144,324 18.0 100 100
Memorandum Items:
Financing to private sector 2,186,524 20.5 68.1 69.5
Financing to general government 200,684 -6.7 8.1 6.4
Total doubtful assets 17,817 22.9 0.5 0.6
Total doubtful assets ratio 0.65
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 38,855 18.5 1.2 1.2
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY JUN-07
(% CHANGE)
JUN-07/
JUN-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-07
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 40,596 -32.3 2.3 1.3
Deposits from credit institutions 466,906 8.5 16.1 14.8
General government 83,236 33.3 2.3 2.6
Other private sectors 1,385,401 15.0 45.2 44.1
Marketable debt securities 643,364 38.2 17.5 20.5
Derivatives 105,435 49.5 2.6 3.4
Subordinated debt 76,178 12.5 2.5 2.4
Provisions 34,858 -2.0 1.3 1.1
Other (a) 124,649 8.5 4.3 4.0
TOTAL LIABILITIES 2,960,623 17.9 94.3 94.2
Minority interests 5,864 -2.5 0.2 0.2
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity 22,390 48.4 0.6 0.7
Own funds 155,446 17.7 5.0 4.9
TOTAL EQUITY 183,700 20.0 5.7 5.8
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,144,324 18.0 100 100
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit Institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including 
valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
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in the first half of 2007 is very similar to that in the same period of the previous year, with net 
lending at around €141,000 million and €145,000 million, respectively. In the second half of 
2006, the lending flow decreased by €11,000 million, the fall being sharper in mortgage lend-
ing.
The slowdown in total lending was seen both in firms and in households (Chart 2.2.A). The 
growth of bank lending to households moderated both in the house purchase segment and in 
the others (basically lending for the purchase of current consumption goods and consumer 
durables). This moderation had already become apparent at the end of the past year. By con-
trast, the slowdown in bank credit to firms is new and attributable in its entirety to the signifi-
cant decrease in the growth rate of credit to construction and property development (from 
43.9% in December 2006 to 35.5% in June 2007). Lending to property developers has slowed 
more rapidly than that to construction companies, although both business segments still show 
brisk growth (42% and 24.4%, respectively), in line with the trend in real estate sector activity. 
Mention should also be made of the acceleration in credit to other firms, in a trend that has 
prevailed uninterruptedly since December 2005. While in terms of rates of change these are 
still well behind construction and property development companies, in terms of net flows the 
distance has narrowed considerably (Chart 2.2.B).
Although as yet modestly, Spanish deposit institutions have begun to diversify their loan port-
folio once again, increasing the relative weight of lending to the industrial and services sectors. 
This process drives and, in turn, is a result of, the shift taking place in the growth pattern of the 
Spanish economy, against a background in which firms are showing substantial financial 
strength (high returns and growing cash flows). Thus in June 2007 the relative weight of cred-
it to other firms became significantly more telling in explaining the behaviour of total lending 
(Chart 2.2.C). Also, the increase in the still-high relative weight of credit to property developers 
in total credit to firms has almost completely halted (Chart 2.2.D), helping to reduce the con-
centration of institutions’ loan portfolios.
… both in households and 
in construction and property 
development…
… and the relative weight of 
the real estate sector in 
bank balance sheets has 
begun to lessen.
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a. Weighted average of default probabilities.
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As was to be expected, doubtful assets have continued to rise, their year-on-year growth rate 
accelerating to 24% (Chart 2.3.A). This initiated a process of normalisation taking Spanish 
banks towards the higher doubtful assets levels shown by the banks of other European coun-
tries. It should be kept in mind that the doubtful assets ratios of Spanish institutions are around 
one-third of the EU average. Also, as pointed out in the last FSR, this behaviour is due to the 
lag between the growth of loans and that of doubtful assets, and to the new accounting regu-
lations which require the full amount of a loan to be classified as doubtful three months after 
the failure to pay only one instalment2. The increase in doubtful assets is closely related to past 
lending growth, so it is not surprising that credit to households for house purchases, which is 
a credit segment that has shown high rates of expansion in this decade until very recently, is 
that which now exhibits the highest increase in doubtful assets, followed by other credit to 
households. In addition to the accounting regulations and the strong credit growth in the past, 
Following the high buoyancy 
of activity and the 
accounting changes, 
doubtful assets are growing 
more quickly,
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2. For more details, see Box 2.1 of the May 2007 FSR.
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the substantial rise in interest rates in the euro area from end-2005 (the rate on ECB main re-
financing operations has doubled) also helps to explain the higher doubtful assets. Further-
more, although the doubtful assets on loans to non-financial corporations have accelerated 
since the last FSR, they are rising more moderately, which reflects the strength of the Spanish 
corporate sector. Once again, the business segments that grew most in the past (construction 
and property development) are those with the highest growth of doubtful assets, although their 
doubtful assets ratios are very low (0.49% and 0.32%, respectively).
These developments in doubtful assets translate into a slight rise in the relative weight of 
lower-risk assets (linked to mortgage credit), with the resulting relative decrease in doubtful 
assets linked to corporate credit (Chart 2.3.B).
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Despite the growth in doubtful assets, the doubtful assets ratios remain, except in consumer 
credit, at very low levels (Chart 2.3.C). Thus that for house purchase credit to households is at 
0.49%, with a slight increase in this half, while that for consumer credit has continued growing 
to 2.32%. This explains why the household doubtful assets ratio is 0.76%, against 0.64% in 
December 2006. By contrast, in the corporate segment the doubtful assets ratio continues to 
fall (0.58% in June 2007). 
Accordingly, doubtful assets ratios are still very low, although in the coming months they can 
be expected to keep rising as a result of the aforementioned lag between lending and de-
faults, the accounting change and the impact of interest rates. An assessment of their long-
term path has to take into account their past behaviour (Chart 2.3.D). Thus, for example, the 
current doubtful assets levels in house purchase loans to individuals are well below those 
around 1993 during the last economic recession in Spain. In this respect, three observations 
can be made. First, the state of the Spanish economy at that time (negative GDP growth ex-
ceeding 1 pp, high budget deficit and unemployment rates above 20%) differs considerably 
from today’s worst-case scenario. Second, credit institutions have made significant progress 
in risk monitoring methods and control. Third, despite the foregoing, it cannot be ignored that 
in 1993 the doubtful assets ratio of house purchase loans to individuals, although high, did not 
rise above 4%, with an increase of 1.5 pp relative to the average level in the previous upturn. 
In addition, the effective loss for institutions was considerably less in that they managed to 
recover a large part of the amount owed to them by selling the property used as loan collat-
eral.
The detailed information in the CCR can be used to supplement the aforementioned informa-
tion on the doubtful assets ratio. Since the origination date of a loan, and the date when it 
became past-due, if at all, are known, curves can be constructed of the default rate over time 
for the loans granted on a particular date3. A sharp increase in one of these curves indicates 
that the loans granted on that date were particularly risky (for example, because the institu-
tions significantly relaxed their credit approval policies, as seen in US sub-prime mortgages 
in recent curves). By contrast, a general increase in all curves indicates a general worsening 
of doubtful assets ratios attributable to the macroeconomic setting (higher interest rates) and 
not to a specific deterioration in credit policy or to a phenomenon of one-off adverse selec-
tion.
Since 2003 the picture shown by default rate curves (Chart 2.4.A) has worsened slightly, al-
though the 2005 curve practically coincides with that for 2002. More recently (loans granted in 
2006), the slope of the curve is somewhat steeper, although the level reached continues to be 
very low. Indeed, the most significant feature of these curves is their low level: one year after 
loan origination, the default rate is around 0.20%. The data for the volume of doubtful assets 
are very similar. Comparison with the US sub-prime market curves (Chart 2.4.B) clearly shows 
the enormous differences in terms of default level and approval policy standards, particularly if 
recent dates are analysed. What is more, in the Spanish case, if the high recorded in the 2006 
curve is compared with the lowest default rate attained after the same lapse of time from 
… although doubtful assets 
ratios continue at very low 
levels, with slight rises in 
households….
… and decreases in firms.
The default rate curves are 
consistent with a slight 
general deterioration in 
doubtful assets ratios…
3. To construct default rate curves, for each quarter the loans originated in the previous three months are monitored. 
Specifically, for a portfolio of loans granted at time t, their default rate k quarters later is calculated as the number of 
doubtful loans at the future time t+k divided by the original number of loans. The x-axis indicates the quarter after loan 
origination, such that a value of 1 denotes the first quarter after the loan was originated. When the curves are annual, they 
represent the average default rate calculated for each portfolio of new loans originated in the first, second, third and 
fourth quarters of the year in question. Since the CCR does not contain express information on house purchase mort-
gages, the measurement used to proxy them was all financial credit granted to households for amounts exceeding 
€60,000, maturity exceeding five years, fully collateralised and arranged by fewer than four participants.
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origination in any other year (in this case, the 2003 curve), the increase found in the default rate 
is only 0.11 pp. However, if this analysis is performed on US sub-prime mortgages, the in-
crease is 10 pp. Therefore, Spain does not have adverse selection or relaxation of risk control 
criteria in loan origination in recent years.
Analysis of the last few years (Chart 2.4.C) shows a progressive deterioration in default rate 
curves. This deterioration is general, so, rather than a problem in lending conditions in a given 
period, it reflects a general worsening in doubtful assets ratios (as mentioned above). The in-
terest rate trend in the past year probably explains the steeper slope of the curves. In any 
event, the most noteworthy feature is again the fact that, despite the slight deterioration, the 
level of default rates in mortgage lending is very low, evidencing the high quality of these as-
sets. This is in line with their traditional behaviour in Spain, since house purchase mortgage 
lending has always been the least risky business segment.
… which, however, are 
notable for their low level…
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The CCR data do not distinguish whether the mortgage is for a first or second home, or 
whether the borrower intends to use the house or sell it (investment motive). However, the 
results of the above-mentioned default analysis, when limited to mortgage loans to house-
holds in the coastal Mediterranean and island provinces, where the percentage of second 
homes (Chart 2.4.D) is higher, do not show a noticeably different profile from that of total 
mortgages, the default level being only slightly higher (5 bp). Nor are significant differences 
found when analysis focuses only on the provinces that are most active in property develop-
ment4.
The only segment of the mortgage business identifiable as having higher default rates is that 
of mortgage lending to foreign residents, be they from other EU countries or from the rest of 
the world. However, this behaviour is not recent but of a structural nature. Thus the default rate 
curve for 2003, the lowest year, is more than double for foreign residents than for households 
as a whole. In any event, the relative weight of this business segment in household mortgages, 
although growing in recent years, is only 7.2% of the total.
Default rate curves for corporate loans can also be constructed. These curves for the con-
struction and property development sector (Chart 2.5.A) show some deterioration dating from 
2003 but, once again, the rates are very low. Very similar, albeit somewhat lower, levels 
(Chart 2.5.B) are found for other firms. 
The exposure to the US sub-prime market is the cause of the turbulence affecting the inter-
national financial markets in recent months. Transparency regarding such exposure is one of 
the factors that should help the markets to recoup a greater level of normality and, in addi-
tion, enable greater discrimination between institutions via price. The doubtful assets ratios 
… even in the second-home 
segment…
… and in firms, including 
construction companies and 
property developers.
In Spain there is no
sub-prime mortgage 
market.
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4. Note that, in any event, this is an approximation not exempt from limitations because in the coastal provinces it does 
not distinguish between first and second homes, nor does it include mortgages taken out in other Spanish provinces to 
acquire second homes on the Mediterranean coast. However, it seems a reasonable first approximation.
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and default rate curves, even in the highest-risk segments, are clearly lower than those in the 
US sub-prime market (Chart 2.4), showing that these two credit markets are not related in 
any way, whether in terms of definition, of the credit policy practised by institutions or of the 
level of risk assumed. Even in a scenario with a very low probability such as that of 1993 
(recession, high budget deficit and very high unemployment rates), the doubtful assets ratios 
in mortgage lending to households in Spain are much better than those of the sub-prime 
segment.
As part of the Banco de España’s customary monitoring of the risks incurred by Spanish de-
posit institutions, a study was made of those to which they may be exposed in the US sub-
prime market. This study focused on obtaining information on the following direct and indirect 
risks: i) risks due to granting of sub-prime mortgages directly or through subsidiaries; ii) lines 
of credit granted and any other commitment to institutions involved in transactions with sub-
prime exposures; and iii) risks arising from other types of investments related to sub-prime 
mortgages in the US, such as the first-loss tranche of asset-backed bonds known as collater-
alised debt obligations (CDOs)5, the underlying assets of which are related to these mortgages. 
The study found that the risks to which the analysed Spanish institutions were exposed in this 
connection in June 2007 represent 0.03% of their assets and 0.68% of their tier 1 capital. 
Therefore, the exposure of Spanish banks to the US sub-prime market is completely marginal 
in terms of its potential impact on both profitability and solvency.
Asset securitisation has developed strongly at international level in recent years, enabling insti-
tutions to raise funds and re-allocate risk more efficiently. Spanish institutions have participated 
actively in this process, as might be expected in view of their management capabilities, level 
of development and recent expansion. However, it should be noted that securitisation transac-
tions are not as complex in Spain as in other banking systems.
As explained in Chapter 1, part of the turbulence assailing the international financial system is 
due to uncertainty about the level of risk associated with certain complex products (CDOs, 
CLOs, etc.) through which some underlying assets could be linked to the US sub-prime seg-
ment. Moreover, numerous banks involved in this process have engaged in the practice of 
originating sub-prime mortgages, granting the loan and immediately distributing (i.e. securitis-
ing) it to rid themselves of the risk and obtain additional liquidity with which to originate fresh 
loans. This securitisation business model differs substantially from that followed by the more 
traditional banks (like those in Spain). Under this traditional model, the risk, or a good part of 
it, remains on the balance sheet, meaning the bank has an adequate incentive to keep pursu-
ing a rigorous loan approval policy. The Spanish securitisation model does not separate origi-
nation from risk management and the incentives of the loan originator are well aligned with 
those of the investors that acquire the securitised loan. In short, risk transmission is limited and 
the incentive to select borrowers adequately has not been weakened as in the originate-to 
distribute model applied by numerous US institutions.
Detailed study of the securitisation transactions of the last two years has demonstrated the 
high quality of the underlying assets. Underlying asset quality is a key factor in determining the 
risk of this product for investors and, therefore, the cost of the funding obtained by the bank. 
The information in the CCR shows that the securitised assets of households (the vast bulk of 
which are mortgage loans) have a lower doubtful assets ratio than those not securitised (40 bp 
Asset securitisation in Spain 
involves less complex 
processes than in other 
countries,…
… differs from the originate-
to-distribute model,…
… and is characterised by 
high-quality underlying 
assets.
5. A CDO (collateralised debt obligation) is a securitisation structure in which the securitised asset portfolio is consider-
ably more heterogeneous than in traditional securitisation. These structures may include different types of bonds and 
loans (collateralised loan obligation or CLO), including those from other securitisations.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2007
less in June 2007), evidencing the higher quality of securitised loans6. Securitised mortgages 
have an average LTV (loan amount divided by the appraised value of the property used as col-
lateral for the transaction) of around 70%, with a slight tendency to move upwards in recent 
times (Chart 2.6.A). Note that this LTV is that calculated at the origination date and that, with 
the passage of time, the mere process of repaying the loan continuously reduces the LTV7. The 
geographical concentration indices of the securitised mortgage loan portfolio are low (Herfin-
dahl index of around 0.3, which coincides with that of the credit portfolio). Also contributing to 
the geographical diversification is the practice by which various institutions pool their portfolios 
for joint securitisation.
Finally, around 94% of asset-backed bonds are triple A, i.e. they have the maximum credit 
quality rating awarded by rating agencies (Chart 2.6.B). Hence the lower-rated tranches, in-
cluding the reserve fund set aside to be used first to absorb losses, represent around 6% of 
securitisations, based on assets (mortgage loans for house purchase) whose doubtful assets 
ratio is currently around 0.5% and, as stated above, failed to reach 4% at the height of the 
last Spanish recession (Chart 2.3.D). Moreover, the realisation of assets subsequently ena-
bled a good part of the outstanding loan amount to be recovered in many cases, that is to 
say, the loss in cases of default on these assets has historically been very low. Hence it is 
difficult to conceive a scenario in which the losses would extend to the higher-rated tranches. 
This would only be possible if the default rates were very high (for example, 12%) and if the 
loss given default reflected very low foreclosure values (for example, 50% of the residual 
value of the loan). These situations are highly unlikely taken separately and much more so 
taken together.
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6. In June 2007 the securitised assets of firms (largely loans to SMEs) represented around 20% of total securitised 
credit, and their doubtful assets ratio was also lower than that of on-balance-sheet loans to firms. 7. Naturally, the in-
crease in house market value further reduces this LTV. For example, not counting repayments, a LTV of 80% (100%) in 
2003 becomes 53.7% (67.2%) in 2007.
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Recently, coinciding with the turbulence in international financial markets, the spreads in the 
secondary market in which Spanish asset-backed bonds and covered bonds are traded have 
widened. This widening of spreads, also seen in other market segments, largely reflects the 
process of reassessment of risk levels and the consequent adjustment of risk premiums in 
progress since last summer. However, given the high quality of Spanish underlying assets, it 
seems that the widening of spreads may also reflect certain tensions in the investors holding 
these products which, in turn, are a reflection of the liquidity difficulties besetting them be-
cause they cannot roll over the commercial paper used to finance these assets. It is estimated 
that around two-thirds of the total amount securitised in Spain could be in the hands of wide-
ly diverse foreign investors. These include, on the one hand, investors such as insurance 
companies and investment and pension funds and, on the other, investors with a more varia-
ble time horizon, high gearing and a greater dependence on short-term financing, whether 
from banks or from others. The marking-to-market of these assets, together with secondary-
market movements, may give rise to significant losses in some of these investors dependent 
on short-term funding, because of a significant increase in the liquidity premium8. However, as 
the financial turbulence subsides and market liquidity returns, these spreads will gradually nar-
row, given the high quality of the underlying assets and the credit enhancements included in 
securitisations in Spain (Chart 2.6.B).
The slowdown in credit to the private sector in business in Spain and the good progress of 
deposits taken from Spanish households and firms, against a background of sustained eco-
nomic expansion and sound performance of employment and of business activity have meant 
that in the past year, and particularly in the last half, the difference between the two growth 
rates has decreased (Chart 2.7.A). The continuation of this trend in the near future, as the 
lending growth rate adjusts to a normalising real estate market and financial institutions in-
crease the amount of new saving captured, competing with other financial intermediaries, will 
reduce the pressure to resort to the wholesale market to finance lending activity. 
The observed increase in 
the cost of Spanish asset-
backed bonds and of 
covered bonds is due more 
to market conditions than to 
the quality of the securities 
issued.
The recent slowdown in 
lending and pick-up in 
deposit growth suggest that 
the need for borrowing in 
wholesale markets will 
decrease…
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8. Box 2.1 comments on the different types of valuation of financial assets and, in particular, on the conditions necessary 
for applying them.
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For this reason, the relative weight of deposits from the resident private sector with respect to 
credit to this sector will foreseeably increase. This ratio has decreased significantly over the 
past decade (Chart 2.7.B) and in June 2007 was 76.2% (131.3% if the ratio is credit to depos-
its)9. This business structure clearly reflects the predominance of the traditional retail banking 
model in Spain10, although without spurning the possibilities offered by markets and new fi-
nancial instruments (securitisation), particularly if they involve simple operating procedures and 
high-quality underlying assets. It should be noted that the extensive branch network, the con-
siderable relative weight that deposit institutions have in the distribution of other products 
designed to channel saving (investment and pension funds, insurance policies, etc.) and the 
close contact maintained with bank customers may enable Spanish institutions, in the event 
… in a banking system in 
which traditional retail 
banking predominates…
… which makes it easier to 
replace wholesale funding, if 
necessary, with customer 
deposits.
Heightening uncertainty as a result of the increased volatility of inter-
est and exchange rates and of commodities prices in the late 70s 
prompted the use of financial derivatives as a means both of mitigat-
ing risks and of operating with them as a new source of business. In 
turn, there was a significant qualitative leap in academic research 
from 1973 with the papers by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and 
Robert C. Merton on rational option valuation.
Given that the cost of most derivatives is zero, these were initially re-
corded as off-balance sheet transactions due to the difficulties of 
valuing them at cost. The existence of more or less liquid markets 
together with the development of accepted valuation methodologies 
used by financial market participants to set their price diminished the 
credibility of information based on historical cost. Accordingly, the 
principal accounting regulators (IASB and FASB) called for the disclo-
sure of information on fair value in the notes to financial statements. 
Subsequently, consensus was reached in the late 90s over the fact 
that fair value was the only relevant measure for investors in respect 
of financial instruments, and most particularly of derivatives.
Fair value is a rational price which is either obtained directly from real 
transactions in an active market or from a valuation model that seeks 
to reproduce the price which, under normal business conditions, the 
entity would receive if it were to sell the asset or the amount it would 
need to deliver to acquire its liabilities. Accounting standards set a 
series of criteria to be met by any model: i) it should be commonly 
used by market participants and incorporate all the factors that a par-
ticipant would consider on setting the price; ii) it should be consistent 
with the principles of financial theory; iii) it should use the time value of 
money, volatility, risk premiums, liquidity, and other relevant variables; 
and iv) it should be regularly calibrated against real transactions.
As regards credit risk, fair value estimation models face the difficulties 
proper to the modelling of this risk: the estimation of probability of 
default, recovery rates and correlations between defaults. Most credit 
instruments, as is the case with securitisations, do not have an active 
market, and the model is therefore not derived from a statistical analy-
sis of prices based on their historical experience, and nor is there in-
formation on defaults of each instrument. As an example of a struc-
tured product, CDOs have as their underlying portfolio loans transferred 
to a vehicle which issues bonds with different ratings (senior, mezza-
nine, equity) that reflect seniority in regard of the absorption of losses. 
The rating agencies play an important role as they are responsible for 
assigning a rating to the different tranches of the vehicles.
Entities should disclose information of help for evaluating the uncer-
tainty of the estimates. They should inform as to whether the fair value 
is obtained from an observable price or from a valuation model. They 
should further offer information on the model used and the most rele-
vant hypotheses employed, and on the effect on fair value of the range 
of potential alternative assumptions, if a change in any of the latter 
should result in a significantly different valuation (stress testing). The in-
formation on fair value should be complemented with sensitivity meas-
ures (such as VaR), consistency analysis (such as back testing) and test 
methods (excess frequency testing). As regards credit risk, an analysis 
of the entity’s exposure thereto should be included, using external or 
internal ratings, along with information on historical default rates.
The paradigm change from historical cost to fair value involves the 
provision of information that is useful for investors, but not exempt 
from new risks. Mark-to-model valuation (i.e. using a model) gives 
rise to model risk, since fair value in the case of instruments without 
an active market is an estimate about the future on the basis of past 
and present information, and the model is based on past relation-
ships that have to hold in the future for the estimate to be correct. The 
estimation models are rather market agreements, and not so much 
scientific laws. Accordingly, their reliability is based on the consensus 
of market agents as they use them for price formation.
FAIR VALUE BOX 2.1
9. If both residents and non-residents are counted, the ratio of deposits to credit increases to nearly four-fifths (78% in 
June 2007). If, furthermore, credit to and deposits from general government are included, this ratio rises, in June 2007, 
to 80.3%. 10. In Spain there is a close relationship between banks and their assets-side customers and, as a result, the 
average number of banking relationships is very low, as shown in the study by G. Jiménez, J. Saurina and R. Townsend 
entitled “Análisis del número de relaciones bancarias en España”, Estabilidad Financiera, forthcoming November 2007. 
This close relationship of firms and households with their banks in the credit market extends to the deposit market, sup-
ported by an extensive branch network which enables banking to be finely attuned to customers and their needs, with 
benefits on both sides.
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that the international financial market turbulence persists, to replace some of the funds raised 
on wholesale markets with different types of bank deposits from their retail customers, pro-
vided that attractive yields are offered. 
As regards the term structure of the liquidity position11 reflected in bank balance sheets, 
the latest available information up to June 2007 shows a favourable performance, with a 
significant decrease in the short position up to one month (from 8% of assets in June 2006 
to 5% in June 2007) and a lengthening between 1 and 12 months (Chart 2.8.A). Of the 
institutions operating in Spain, it is the subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks which, 
at aggregate level, have the most marked short position (around 15% of assets) in maturi-
ties up to one month. In any event, the liquidity position of Spanish deposit institutions re-
flects the traditional transformation of maturities and the customary operating practices 
used in banking.
The recent changes in the term structure of Spanish deposit institutions partly reflects the 
decrease in the interbank short position, down from a high of 7% of total assets in December 
2005 to a low of 4.5% in June 2007. This short interbank position basically reflects the rela-
tionship of foreign subsidiaries and branches that operate in Spain with their own financial 
group (Chart 2.8.B), while Spanish banks have a much more balanced and slightly long posi-
tion (net lenders).
During the period of turbulence, Spanish institutions exhibited a comfortable liquidity posi-
tion, largely because many of them had brought forward their programmes to obtain liquidity 
for the whole of the year and completed them before the summer to take advantage of the 
The liquidity position has 
performed favourably…
… and the interbank short 
position has been reduced.
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a. A negative (positive) value indicates net borrowing (lending).
11. Assets up to one month include, in addition to items maturing in this period, total cash and balances with central 
banks, debt securities, equity instruments included in financial assets held for trading, other financial assets at fair value 
through profit or loss, and quoted available-for-sale financial assets. Liabilities up to one month include total deposits 
from central banks and, as an assumption, 25% of sight deposits. The other 75% is classified as undefined maturity, due 
to the stability of these deposits.
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favourable financial market conditions in the first half of the year (abundant liquidity and very 
low risk premiums). Although some wholesale markets were still not showing clear signs of 
recovery at the end of September 2007, others were functioning without excessive friction. 
Thus Spanish institutions are not finding it difficult to issue in the international short-term note 
market.
In line with the trends noted in previous FSRs, the income statement of Spanish deposit insti-
tutions disclosed a sound position in the first half of the current year. This soundness was evi-
denced in the notable increase in group net income, which grew by 25.6% (Table 2.2). As a 
result, the return on assets (ROA) before (after) tax stood at 1.46% (1.11%), rising in both 
cases by 9 bp with respect to the same period of 2006. The return on equity (ROE), also im-
proved on the previous year, moving up from 19.8% to 21.4% in June 2007, well above the 
return on Spanish long-term debt. This favourable performance of ROE was widespread 
(Chart 2.9.A). The improved ROE performance of Spanish deposit institutions was based, 
above all, on their greater operating efficiency (Chart 2.9.B)12.
The strength of the income statement was evident in the behaviour of the three main operating 
margins, which showed a positive dynamic not only in their rates of change, but also in terms 
of average total assets (Chart 2.10.A). Thus net interest income posted an increase of 20.2%, 
rising by 7 bp relative to average total assets from June 2006 (to 1.83%). The favourable per-
formance of net interest income is driven by the strong behaviour of financial revenue and, in 
particular, against a background of lending growth, of that from customer lending. The rise in 
financial revenue offset the increase in financial costs, which was sharpest in trading securities 
and also in customer deposits, the latter as a result of the effort made by institutions to step 
up their funding from this type of product. In a setting of growing interest rates, the spread 
between marginal lending and deposit rates remained practically unchanged, so the addi-
tional pressure on the funding side was able to be offset by similar increases on the lending 
side (Chart 2.10.B).
The buoyancy of net interest income passed through to gross income, which grew by 19% 
(to 3.16% of ATA, up 9 bp on June 2006). The most buoyant component of gross income 
was gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities, the growth of which is explained by 
the improved behaviour of gains on trading book securities and by the sale of holdings by 
certain institutions. The growth of net gains on financial assets and liabilities offset the less 
vigorous behaviour by the share of profit or loss of investees and by commissions, the latter 
growing by 13.4%, nearly 3 pp less than in the previous year. In fact, compared with the 
growth of activity, that of commissions was down by 1 bp. The lesser buoyancy of commis-
sions was attributable to those for collection and payment services, which posted growth 
of 6.5%. This moderation in the growth of such commissions, which was more marked in 
business in Spain, is related to the more intense competition between institutions. Mean-
while, commissions from the provision of securities services and from the marketing of 
non-bank financial products were somewhat more buoyant, growing by 14% against a 
background of favourable financial market performance, at least in the first half of the 
year.
Operating expenses held on the moderating growth trend observed in previous FSRs. This 
moderation in their growth (7.6%, nearly 2 pp less than in June 2006) accounts for the drop in 
terms of average total assets. By component, staff costs increased somewhat less than over-
heads (7.4% against 8%). In any event, the effort to keep operating expenses at moderate 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY 
Deposit institutions reported 
higher profitability…
… based on the strong 
performance of all their 
operating margins…
… and on efficiency gains…
12. See Box II.1 of the May 2004 FSR for a detailed explanation of the breakdown of ROE.
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levels of growth, along with the favourable performance of gross income, enabled the effi-
ciency ratio to improve further from 49.4% in June 2006 to 44.7% in 2007. This improvement 
was across-the-board in all institutions (Chart 2.11.A). As noted in previous FSRs, a part of the 
efficiency gains derives from the expansionary behaviour of activity, so a slowdown in activity 
JUN-07 JUN-06 JUN-07
€m
(% CHANGE)
JUN. 07-
JUN. 06
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 67,639 35.4 4.13 4.82
Financial costs 42,015 46.7 2.37 3.00
Net interest income 25,624 20.2 1.76 1.83
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method
2,132 3.4 0.17 0.15
Net commissions 11,034 13.4 0.80 0.79
Gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities 5,542 33.5 0.34 0.40
Gross income 44,332 19.0 3.07 3.16
Operating expenses 19,793 7.6 1.52 1.41
Other operating income 682 -14.3 0.07 0.05
Net operating income 25,221 28.3 1.62 1.80
Asset impairment losses 5,198 34.9 0.32 0.37
Provisioning expense (net) 1,046 26.8 0.07 0.07
Other income (net) 1,454 -4.3 0.13 0.11
Profit before tax 20,431 23.8 1.36 1.46
Net income 16,184 23.3 1.09 1.15
Memorandum item:
Group net income 15,529 25.6 1.02 1.11
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit Institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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could adversely affect this indicator. Institutions should be prepared for this eventuality and 
take into account that they may have to tighten their cost control.
Accordingly, the strong performance of gross income, along with the moderate increase in 
operating expenses, gave rise to growth in net operating income of 28.3%, an improvement of 
18 bp in terms of average total assets. The contribution to the growth of net operating income 
(Chart 2.11.B) is basically thanks to the favourable performance of net interest income and to 
the containment of the growth of operating expenses, the relative weight of which has been 
declining over time. The former evidences the continuing significant role of traditional retail 
banking in the business of Spanish deposit institutions, as a result of which their ability to 
generate recurring income is not so closely linked to financial market operations more typical 
of investment banking.
Asset impairment losses, substantially all of which can be attributed to lending, grew by 35% 
with respect to the previous year, partly due to increased doubtful assets and, to a greater 
extent, due to the still-high buoyancy of lending, which led to increases in general provisions 
because the system of recognising asset impairment losses in Spain is counter-cyclical. This, 
together with an increase in provisioning expenses, which grew by 26.8%, resulted in net 
operating income being reduced by 24.8%, which was a similar proportion to that in June 
2006. Finally, despite other profit figures falling slightly, the profit before tax showed notable 
growth, both in absolute terms (23.8%) and in relative terms (9 bp, to 1.46% of average total 
assets).
If financial market turbulence were prolonged in time and wholesale markets were only willing 
to purchase bank instruments (particularly asset-backed bonds and covered bonds) with a 
significantly higher spread, or if institutions decided to compete more intensely to attract tradi-
… the ability to generate 
recurring income being 
closely linked to retail 
banking activity.
The resilience of the income 
statement to persistent 
financial market turbulence 
is high.
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a. These rates are those established in transactions initiated or renewed during
the month prior to that of reference, such transactions being weighted by their volume.
The asset-weighted marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to house
and consumer finance and credit to non-financial corporations, while the liabilities
ones include, inter alia, fixed-term deposits and repos.
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tional bank deposits (demand and time deposits), the average cost of bank deposits would 
increase. If, in addition, we assume that institutions cannot pass this increase through to lend-
ing, which is an extreme assumption as shown by the high correlation between the cost of 
funds raised and the return on lending (Chart 2.10.B), it is possible to assess the impact on the 
income statement. A simple exercise shows that, at consolidated level, an increase of 25 bp 
in the total cost of financing, which under the foregoing assumptions signifies that the spread 
between the return on assets and the cost of liabilities narrows by the same amount, would 
give rise to a deceleration in net interest (operating) income of 5.9% (12.8%), with an increase 
in profit before tax of 5.4%. If the size of the shock is raised to 50 bp, net interest (operating) 
income decreases by 8.3% (2.7%), with a fall in profit before tax of 21.6%13. In short, a very 
direct stress test (with a very low probability of occurrence) on the income statement of Span-
ish deposit institutions shows their high resilience to an unfavourable environment in the inter-
national financial markets involving a resultant increase in the cost of financing and a very 
rapid and marked narrowing of their spread.
The soundness of Spanish deposit institutions is apparent from a comparison with EU banks 
(Chart 2.12). Thus, the available data, which relate to 2006, show that the net interest income 
of Spanish institutions is 27% higher than that of EU countries14, which points, once again, to 
the greater relative importance of the traditional retail model pursued by Spanish banks. The 
fact that these favourable differences to Spain flow through to gross income, albeit somewhat 
diminished, partly reflects the similar level of commission income. However, in terms of net 
The soundness of the 
income statement is also 
apparent when it is 
compared with that of other 
European countries.
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13. A narrowing of the spread by 25 bp is more than twice that experienced by Spanish deposit institutions in the last 
two years. A fall of 50 bp in this spread has taken four years to occur. It follows from this that the assumptions on the 
narrowing of the spread are extreme. 14. The comparative analysis of Spanish banks with those of the European Union 
as a whole is based on ECB information in which the countries that, for this purpose, follow International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRSs) are distinguished from those that do not. This FSR preserves that distinction, Spain being in the 
first set of countries.
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operating income, the positive difference enjoyed by Spain with respect to EU countries as a 
whole widens. The reason is that the better performance of gross income must be added to 
the efforts by Spanish institutions to moderate their operating expenses, which is reflected in 
higher levels of efficiency. Finally, the ROE and ROA summarise the more comfortable position 
of the income statement of Spanish banks compared with that of EU banks.
After a long period of sustained growth of Spanish banks’ stock market quotations (Chart 2.13.
A) in line with the performance of other European banks, from 2007 Q2 and, more markedly, 
from August, there has been some correction of stock market capitalisations, also seen in other 
European and US banks. The correction has been sharper in investment banks and in those 
universal banks with a large component of this type of business. The institutions which, very 
markedly, have most felt the turbulence in the international financial markets are those with an 
extreme specialisation in the mortgage market and with a pronounced dependence on the 
wholesale market for funding their business (such as, for example, certain US and UK institutions 
which obtained around 80% of their total funds from the wholesale market). 
The turbulence in the financial markets has not only affected stock market capitalisations. In 
general, as already seen in Chapter 1, there has been a significant upward adjustment in the 
perception of risk, correcting the previous anomalous situation of scant differentiation of risk 
levels largely stemming from an abundance of liquidity. The information contained in CDSs 
(Credit Default Swaps15) (Chart 2.13.B) indicates that the perception of the risk of institutions 
specialised in investment banking is substantially higher than that of other banks. At a notable 
distance behind them are the German and US institutions. Finally, UK, Spanish and French 
banks show the smallest spreads. The spreads of Spanish banks are smaller than they were 
at the end of 2002. The information on CDSs enables the obtainment of implied probabilities 
of default assigned by the market to banks. These probabilities were around 0.1% in the first 
The quotations of Spanish 
institutions, like those of 
European ones, have been 
affected by the recent 
turbulence, which has been 
significantly more intense for 
investment banks.
This turbulence has also 
prompted an upward
re-adjustment in the 
perception of risk, 
particularly in investment 
banking…
… although in the Spanish 
case the indicators stand at 
low levels below those in 
2002.
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SOURCES: European Central Bank and Banco de España.
a. According to the information provided by the ECB, EU-IFRSs (NON-IFRSs EU)
are those countries that do (not) present their accounts in accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards.
b. EFFIC.: inverse of efficiency ratio, such that values over 100 reflect a better relative
position of Spanish institutions.
15. A credit default swap is a type of credit derivative in which one of the parties acquires protection against the occur-
rence of a certain credit event in exchange for the payment of a premium.
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half of 2007 for the large European and US banks and, when the uncertainty and lack of mar-
ket confidence were precipitated at the beginning of August, they rose significantly (to around 
0.4%), and even more so in investment banks (to somewhat above 1%). 
As regards the other market indicators for the large Spanish banks, the implied volatilities have 
increased, although the levels reached are well below the highs of 2002. The beta, a measure 
of non-diversifiable risk, is around 1.3, i.e. an intermediate level, whereas the ratio of market 
value to book value (Tobin’s q ratio) continues to be among the highest (in June 2007 it was 
2.5). 
During the first half of 2007 Spanish deposit institutions maintained a high level of own funds 
that enabled them comfortably to exceed the regulatory requirements under both Spanish and 
Basel rules. The solvency ratio, calculated on the basis of Spanish requirements, is very sound, 
standing for the third year running at 10.6% (Chart 2.14.A). The decline in the tier 1 ratio has 
been checked, having fallen by only 2 bp, whereby it accounts for 6.9% of risk-weighted as-
sets. The solvency ratio calculated under the Basel rules has declined by 21 bp to 11.8%, i.e. 
almost 50% above the minimum required level.
The favourable course of the economy during the first half of 2007, at both the domestic and 
international levels, explains the 17.2% growth in risk-weighted assets. Compared with the 
dynamism shown by this figure, the comparison with the previous year shows a slowdown of 
3 pp. In particular, credit has continued to be the driving force behind the banking business, 
although the slowdown in house mortgage loans and the growth of exposure to sectors with 
a lower weighting have prompted a 42 bp reduction in the risk profile of deposit institutions 
(the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets) to 66.1%, following several years of continu-
ous increases (Chart 2.14.B).
Total capital has run parallel to requirements. Thus, although they continue to grow at a sound 
pace (17.7%), they have slowed by 2.6 pp. The strong acceleration in tier 1 capital, which has 
posted an increase of 16.8%, and a considerable slowdown in tier 2 capital (61 pp) account 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
Solvency levels remain 
comfortably above the 
regulatory minimum 
requirements.
In line with the increase in 
activity, requirements are 
growing although the risk 
profile of institutions has 
lessened.
Own funds, principally 
driven by tier 1 capital, are 
growing in line with 
requirements...
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for this behaviour. Lower deductions have also contributed positively to the change in own 
funds.
The acceleration in tier 1 capital by over 7 pp was prompted by the growth in reserves (21.3%). 
The sound banking performance during the first half of the year, along with the growth of pref-
erence shares (22.2%), which account for 14% of reserves, lie behind this (Chart 2.15.A). 
Goodwill increased by 16.5%, while losses in consolidated firms rose, although their weight 
continues to be very low. 
Tier 2 capital grew by only 9.8%, following its strong increase in 2006. Its main component, 
subordinated debt, slowed by somewhat more than 11 pp, posting growth of 5.7%. Gains on 
investments in shares meant that asset revaluation reserves grew by 8.5%. The increase in 
general provisions as a result of the growth in credit and of low default rates has provided for 
a bigger increase in own funds (Chart 2.15.B).
Finally, and in line with the last FSR, deductions from own funds fell by 26.9%, driven by divest-
ments of insurance companies. 
The solvency levels of Spanish deposit institutions are similar to those of the EU16 countries as 
a whole. This is the case both for the total solvency ratio and the tier 1 ratio (Chart 2.16.A). 
Although the data revealed that solvency levels tend to be slightly below the EU average, it 
should be borne in mind that in Spain, in recent years, activity has been most buoyant and has 
pushed capital requirements up. Further, the solvency levels of Spanish institutions are com-
Solvency ratios stand at the 
average EU level, while 
doubtful assets ratios in 
Spain are significantly 
lower…
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a. The risk profile is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets.
16. As earlier indicated in the section analysing the profitability of Spanish deposit institutions, the data used for interna-
tional comparison are from the ECB, and a distinction is drawn between countries that follow IFRSs and those that do 
not. It should be recalled that the latest data available refer to 2006.
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fortably above the regulatory requirements. Finally, the doubtful assets ratio for the Spanish 
banking system is very low, clearly below the EU average.
In Spain, prudential regulations place particular emphasis on the need for institutions to make 
proper provision for credit risk, both that incurred and individually identified in specific transac-
tions (specific provisions) and that incurred but not yet identified (general provisions). The conflu-
ence of credit risk over the course of the cycle with this prudential approach make for ample 
coverage of doubtful assets through existing loan loss provisions. Drawing on data from institu-
tions’ individual financial statements, such provisioning is somewhat more than 2.5 times the 
amount of doubtful assets in June 2007 or, expressed otherwise, even if defaults were to double, 
institutions have, at the aggregate level, provisions set aside to cover this increase, without any 
additional impact on earnings for the year (Chart 2.16.B). What is more, specific provisions as at 
June 2007 alone covered almost half of the total of doubtful assets. At the consolidated level, 
provisioning is also high (212% in June 2007), with a very similar breakdown between specific 
and general provisions17. Finally, the Spanish experience has highlighted the fact that loss given 
default (LGD) in the segment of credit to households for house purchases is very low. Institutions, 
through the execution and subsequent sale of the guarantee (the house being financed) gener-
ally recoup a very high portion of the amount owed. Accordingly, a specific provision for, say, half 
of the doubtful amount affords a very high degree of protection to institutions. That is to say, cur-
rent provisioning levels could absorb at least fivefold growth in the present default levels.
Drawing on CCR figures, a model has been constructed to estimate the distribution of Spanish 
deposit institutions’ credit risk losses on the basis of historical data on loans granted by these 
institutions in the past two decades. By means of this model, an analysis has been made of 
… and the provisioning for 
doubtful assets is very high.
Stress tests show the 
considerable capacity of 
Spanish institutions to 
withstand adverse scenarios 
through their provisions and 
their own funds…
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17. Logically, insofar as general provisions are progressively used, these will cease to qualify as tier 2 capital. In any event, 
there is currently a surplus of general provisions not eligible as tier 2 capital of 29%. The sum of this non-eligible surplus 
and cumulative specific provisions cover 94% of doubtful assets as at June 2007.
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the effect of macroeconomic variables such as GDP and interest rates on the proportion of 
defaults, the changes in the total number of loans granted and the loss that these defaults may 
entail for institutions. As a result, it has been possible to calculate the impact that different 
macroeconomic scenarios would have on the distribution of cumulative losses over a time 
horizon of three years18.
This distribution of losses shows a shift rightwards and flattening (Chart 2.17.A) from June 
2006 to June 2007, which is indicative of greater expected and unexpected losses. The in-
crease in the volume of credit granted between both dates explains the shift. However, the 
own funds available at present comfortably cover these losses. Specifically, the expected loss 
amounts to only 37% of the sum of the general and specific provisions of all deposit institu-
tions, while the unexpected loss, calculated at a confidence level of 99.9%, accounts for only 
12% of the system’s aggregated own funds19.
In addition, a stress test on the distribution of losses obtained in 2007 has been con-
ducted. It analyses the impact that four consecutive quarters of GDP declines on a similar 
scale to those that occurred in the 1993 recession would have. It is further assumed that, 
as from the fourth quarter of the shock, it would take two years to regain the previous 
growth levels. As can be seen (Chart 2.17.A), the fundamental effect on the distribution of 
accumulated losses over the next three years would be a considerable increase in credit 
risk. Specifically, the expected loss would increase by 53%, while the unexpected loss, 
also evaluated at 99.9%, might undergo a 33% increase on its current value. Despite the 
harshness of the simulated scenario, this shock would not jeopardise the strength of 
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a. According to the information provided by the ECB, EU-IFRSs (NON-IFRSs EU)
are those countries that do (not) present their accounts in accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards.
19. The unexpected loss for a given confidence level is defined as the difference between the value at risk (VaR) at that 
same confidence level and the expected loss. 18. A more detailed analysis can be found in the paper by G. Jiménez 
and J. Mencía: “Modelling the distribution of credit losses with observable and latent factors”, Documento de Trabajo 
0709, Banco de España.
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Spanish institutions, since the own funds they have accumulated would be capable of 
comfortably absorbing the increase in credit risk losses in the business in Spain. In par-
ticular, the expected loss in this stress test scenario would only amount to 57% of the sum 
of the general and specific provisions, while the unexpected loss would only be 16% of 
own funds.
The combination of exposure to the external sector, in terms of financial assets located outside 
Spain (chiefly loans and fixed-income securities, both to the private and public sectors), with 
the attendant default probability allows a ceiling to be obtained for expected losses in business 
abroad. These foreign assets of Spanish deposit institutions have scarcely changed in the past 
year. The favourable performance of the world economy and, in particular, of those regions in 
which Spanish banks operate (Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the United 
States) means that it has been possible to maintain very low default probabilities for foreign 
assets (close to zero for public debt and below 2% in financing to the private sector). As a 
result of this, risk exposure (maximum expected loss on foreign assets, without including pos-
sible recoveries) stood in June 2007 at 4.23% of own funds, the lowest level this decade 
(Chart 2.17.B).
Despite the high relative weight of credit institutions in the Spanish financial system 
(Chart 2.18.A), the monitoring of other financial intermediaries is needed to complete the 
analysis of financial stability. The total assets of Spanish insurance companies grew by 
7.2% in 2006 to €206 billion. As mentioned in the previous FSR, the balance-sheet struc-
ture of Spanish insurance companies shows a high proportion (slightly over 50%) of their 
assets to be in fixed-income investments, while equities account for a relatively very low 
weight (around 5%). Unit-linked policies, in which the policyholder assumes the risk of the 
investment, grew by 17.5%, representing somewhat more than 5% of the sector’s total 
assets.
… while expected losses on 
foreign financial assets are 
at minimum levels.
2.2 Other financial 
market participants
2.2.1 INSURANCE COMPANIES
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b. Risk exposure: maximum expected loss when recoveries are not considered.
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The exposure of insurance companies to fixed income means that interest rate dynamics 
become a key factor of how their business fares. Indeed, at the European level20, interest-
rate risk has been identified as being of prime concern for the industry, in a setting in which 
rates have held at very low levels. Although a very pronounced increase in interest rates 
might have very adverse effects for the sector, a moderate rise is seen as a favourable factor. 
Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that in Spain the time horizons of investments have 
progressively lengthened over recent years, while a high proportion of insurance policies are 
managed by means of duration immunisation. For these reasons, the exposure of the Span-
ish insurance industry to interest-rate risk appears to be low, as evident in the surveyed 
opinions taken from companies in the sector, which do not identify it as one of the biggest 
concerns.
European insurance companies, insofar as their equities investments are significant, have also 
expressed concern at developments on financial markets. Although many companies develop 
provisioning and diversification strategies for these investments, the factors of uncertainty aris-
ing from the recent turbulence have intensified this element of risk. Once again, Spanish com-
panies have not identified this risk as one of their main concerns, largely because of their lim-
ited investment in equities.
Risks associated with natural catastrophes are considered at the European level to be a factor 
to be taken into consideration, while Spanish companies have not expressed any excessive 
concern in this connection. As indicated in the previous FSR, it should be borne in mind that, 
in Spain, risks relating to catastrophes and terrorism, among others, are covered by the Con-
sorcio de Compensación de Seguros (Insurance Compensation Consortium). 
Interest rate movements…
… and securities market 
fluctuations are not 
identified as particular risks 
for Spanish insurance 
companies.
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20. Part of the appraisal of the risks affecting the European insurance industry has been obtained from the Spring 2007 
Report on Financial Conditions and Financial Stability in the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Fund Sector 
(CEIOPS-July 2007).
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Common ground on the challenges and concerns facing the Spanish and European insurance 
industries has been found mainly in four areas. First, the risk of longevity, inasmuch as this may 
be increasing at a greater-than-expected pace, and underwriting risk, insofar as premiums are 
not properly valued to cover all necessary contingencies. Further, the challenges entailed by 
changes in the tax and regulatory framework are highlighted. Thus, from the tax standpoint, 
some Spanish companies have stated that these changes might act in favour of deposit insti-
tutions, thereby stepping up the competition to capture savings. Finally, the regulatory chang-
es to which institutions are already adapting (IFRSs and Solvency II) also represent significant 
challenges.
Spanish insurance companies have been evidencing robustness in their financial position and 
their business in recent years. As regards the coverage of the solvency margin, the estimates 
available for 2006 in the previous FSR appear to have been confirmed, standing at 189% for 
life assurance and at 370% for the non-life branch.
Forecasts for the industry as regards business in 2007 indicate that this will be a good year. 
This is suggested by the data available on premiums at the time of this FSR going to press. In 
the first half of 2007, premiums in the life branch were estimated to have grown by 18.9% 
year-on-year, while the related rate in the non-life branch was 5.8%. In the non-life segment, 
the growth rates of premiums remained high in health and multi-risk insurance (9.3% and 
9.1%, respectively). However, the multi-risk branch might feel the effects of its links to new 
mortgage loans. Car insurance, where premiums in the first half of the year accounted for 40% 
of the non-life branch, grew at a rate of 3.6% owing to the heightened competition in the sec-
tor. Nonetheless, one factor which might be bearing favourably on this business is the reduc-
tion in claims.
Since January 2007, the total assets of collective investment institutions (CIIs) have increased 
by €5,898 million (1.75%) to €342,909 million. Within CIIs, the assets of mutual funds, which 
account for 74.7% of the total, have increased by 0.69%. In the first eight months of the year, 
the return on funds stood at 2.02%, with equity and balanced equity funds to the fore. As to 
net share subscriptions, the result for the year to date is negative, especially in the last four 
months, during which net redemptions of over €2,500 million have been recorded (Chart 2.18 B). 
While it is probably still too early to assess the impact of the recent turbulence on interna-
tional financial markets, returns on mutual funds in July and August were negative, with net 
redemptions of around €1,600 million. 
Pension funds grew by 2.94% in the first six months of the year (13.7% year-on-year), exceed-
ing €83 billion. Association pension plans posted the highest growth (4.54%). Returns over the 
past 12 months stand at over 8%.
Admittedly, net subscriptions to mutual funds in recent months have not been particularly 
significant when viewed over a broad timespan; but they do highlight the challenges this type 
of institution must face, in a setting in which deposit institutions will foreseeably step up com-
petition to capture household and corporate saving. Such competition is more readily provided 
for by the personal income tax reform undertaken21, which has brought the taxes on these 
types of products into line. This competition may be broadened if uncertainty persists on finan-
cial markets and if current and potential shareholders prefer saving strategies less tied to 
market fluctuations. Moreover, it should be recalled that around 80% of the assets of mutual 
Challenges arising from the 
risk of longevity and of 
underwriting have however 
been identified…
… as have those relating to 
tax and regulatory changes.
Nonetheless, Spanish 
companies have been 
evidencing robustness …
… and the forecasts for the 
industry this year are 
favourable.
2.2.2 OTHER FINANCIAL 
MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Mutual fund assets have 
increased slightly in the year 
to date, with net 
subscriptions declining…
… set against current 
market conditions and 
competition in the banking 
sector to capture 
customers.
21. The following Chapter explains this reform in greater detail.
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funds in Spain and 50% of those of pension funds are managed by institutions linked to bank-
ing groups.
As regards private equity activities and, in particular, leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), one of the 
financial market segments that had been most influenced by the abundance of liquidity22, 
market sentiment has changed drastically compared with that noted in the previous FSR. The 
turbulence unleashed during the summer has meant that much of the activity in this market 
has diminished. Firstly, the availability of funds to finance this type of operation has declined 
owing to liquidity tightness. Secondly, the major international banks involved in these opera-
tions focus, above all, on reducing the exposure in their balance sheets, in the face of the dif-
ficulties of syndicating or placing financing tranches to which they had committed (pipeline 
risk), having counted on easy subsequent distribution against a background of abundant li-
quidity and a high appetite for risk. In this respect, it should be stressed that In this respect, for 
the Spanish institutions that have participated in this type of activity, the level of risk retained in 
relation to these operations is relatively small compared with the total volume. Finally, in line 
with the reappraisal of risk on international markets, banks are being more cautious in these 
operations which, until recently, entail very high leverage and few guarantees for the lender 
banks. In sum, the volume of activity in this segment is expected to moderate significantly, 
particularly for very large-scale operations. 
Private equity activity has 
been adversely affected by 
liquidity tightness and by the 
diminished appetite for risk.
22. Private equity is understood to encompass those activities in which a group of investors acquires a company with the 
aim of restructuring it, making it more profitable and selling it on subsequently so as to gain a return on their investment. 
Many private equity activities are conducted by substantially increasing the indebtedness of the acquired company (lever-
aged buy-outs).
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3 Structural elements of the financial system
The recent turbulence on international financial markets, the impact on the interbank market 
and the response of central banks have highlighted the significance of certain structural as-
pects relating to the collateral policy of central banks. At national level, the potential tightening 
of deposit institutions’ financing conditions may lead these entities to compete more fiercely 
with other financial intermediaries to capture household and corporate saving. Changes in 
taxation on financial products may play a considerable role in such competition. These two 
matters are analysed in this Chapter, which is devoted to the analysis of structural elements of 
the financial system with a potential impact on financial stability.
Central banks should perform the functions entrusted to them efficiently. It is well known that 
efficiency in the implementation of monetary policy and in the management of payment sys-
tems requires an appropriate collateral (guarantees) policy. The dislocations in financial mar-
kets in the second half of 2007 have, moreover, highlighted how crucial this policy is in a situ-
ation of turbulence. 
Against this background of financial market tensions, one of the defining characteristics of an 
appropriate collateral policy has been seen to be its extensiveness. In other words, the set of 
eligible assets should be sufficiently extensive as to allow the central bank to provide the nec-
essary liquidity, without undermining the solvency of its balance sheet in the process.
The validity of the foregoing statement becomes clear when bearing in mind how the collateral 
framework at different central banks (the Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England) has contributed to managing the turbulence in question. In the Eurosystem, the collat-
eral policy may be said to have been neutral, insofar as it has not influenced liquidity provision 
procedures in any way. But this has not been the outcome in every case. To analyse the causes, 
a comparative study of the collateral policy of these three central banks should be made.
The collateralisation framework of regular operations in the Eurosystem responds to a criterion 
that is to some extent opposed to that followed by the US Federal Reserve and by the Bank 
of England. While the assets backing ordinary liquidity injection operations are only govern-
ment and federal agency1 debt in the case of the Federal Reserve, or only government debt in 
the case of Bank of England, in the Eurosystem the regular refinancing operations may be 
guaranteed by a broad range of debt instruments, as will be described below.
The greater effective extensiveness of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework is also patent 
when regard is had to the collateralisation used in the case of the marginal lending facility. In 
this connection, it should be recalled that, although its use is penalised, the lending facility is 
also an ordinary refinancing mechanism. In the Bank of England, resort to the lending facility is 
collateralised as a regular operation, although, as stated, eligible assets are confined to gov-
ernment debt. 
Further qualifications are needed when drawing comparisons with the US lending facility. While 
the so-called “primary credit discount window” is a similar facility to the Eurosystem marginal 
3.1 Institutions’ collateral 
policy
An appropriate collateral 
policy contributes to the 
efficient performance of a 
central bank’s tasks…
… with its extensiveness 
being a defining 
characteristic of such policy.
The Eurosystem’s collateral 
framework maintains greater 
effective extensiveness…
1. The term “federal agency debt” requires some clarification. It does not only include debt issued directly by fed-
eral agencies, but also the debt of specific private bodies operating under licence and with public objectives. These 
include mortgage associations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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lending facility, the “secondary credit discount window” is for emergency assistance. Coverage 
of the credit risk resulting from both facilities is, as in the Eurosystem, through a broad spec-
trum of eligible assets. However, the persistence of a degree of stigma associated with resort 
to “primary credit”, as though it were an emergency recourse, still marks a considerable differ-
ence with the Eurosystem framework.
The greater effective extensiveness of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework in normal condi-
tions, along with the lack of stigma associated with resort to ordinary financing mechanisms 
(with penalty or not), have been decisive in allowing for comfortable management of market 
tensions, for three reasons.
First, the scale of the (hypothetical) liquidity problems that would require resort to emergency 
procedures should, all other things being equal, be greater in the Eurosystem. In other words, 
a broad set of eligible assets in normal conditions enables the prevalence of the conditions of 
normality to be prolonged.
Second, a wide-ranging criterion of eligibility in normal conditions presupposes that the col-
lateral management apparatus needed is available at all times. In this respect, it should be 
noted that the counterpart to the formal flexibility that the collateralisation framework for the 
Federal Reserve’s primary credit and emergency operations guarantees is the fact that certain 
possible types of collateralisation have not been implemented for a long time. 
Finally, mention should be made of the operational efficiency that ensues when an extensive 
collateral policy allows for the simultaneous coverage both of the central bank’s credit expo-
sure attributable purely to financing operations and the exposure stemming from the operation 
of the payment systems under its charge.
The extensiveness of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework is highlighted by the fact that the 
volume of assets deposited in the Eurosystem during 2006 was, on average, around 10% of 
eligible assets. Reinforcing this argument of formal sufficiency, close to 40% of what was de-
posited in 2006 was not actually used. At end-August 2007, unused collateral in Spain ac-
counted for almost 70% of the collateral deposited2.
Without detracting from the foregoing, it should be observed that the extensiveness of the 
collateral framework cannot be unlimited. The need for specificity in discharging functions 
precludes an extensive collateral framework from being synonymous with one governed by the 
principle of universality. Specifically, the need to avoid disguised tax distortions and alterations 
in price formation on markets, and to conform to the prevailing legal framework mean, inter 
alia, that assets eligible as collateral should comprise a limited category.
The document entitled “The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area” outlines the 
harmonised collateral framework in the Eurosystem since early 20073. This is not the place to 
discuss it in detail. However, attention should be drawn to some of its main features. Specifi-
cally, assets accepted as collateral should be creditworthy unsubordinated debt instruments 
in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Eurosystem credit assessment framework 
… which while not 
unlimited…
2. This figure should be qualified as it is an aggregate and time-specific measure. However, there have been no collat-
eral restrictions to date either at the level of specific institutions or at any point in time. 3. The harmonised framework 
will come fully into force in 2012. Until then there will be an adaptation period in which the various national central banks 
shall adjust their previous practices. The collateral framework in force in Spain is regulated by Technical Application No. 
1/2006 of the SLBE (Banco de España Settlement Service).
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(ECAF). The extensiveness of the Eurosystem’s collateral policy is determined by the accept-
ability both of marketable and non-marketable assets, and of assets that meet certain mini-
mum credit standards, irrespective of whether such standards are set by rating agencies, 
central bank internal validation systems, internal models of the counterparties themselves or 
automated rating solutions. 
Naturally, there are specific rules covering different operational, contractual and legal aspects 
that outline in greater detail which assets are eligible or not, along with their actual capacity to 
mobilise funds4. Thus, for instance, the Eurosystem does not accept individual liabilities, even 
if they are mortgage-backed. This does not mean that the counterparties’ investments in this 
category of assets cannot be discounted in the Eurosystem. The acceptability of covered 
bonds and similar instruments, and that of asset-backed bonds, is a means for the rediscount-
ing of mortgage-backed securities. Nor does the Eurosystem accept collateral provided by 
counterparties with close links to the issuer of the debt in question. This measure is a safe-
guard against potential situations of double default, whose (conditional) probability is obvi-
ously greater in situations involving close links.
Conversely, the collateral policy pursued by the Federal Reserve in its primary and secondary 
discount window programs does not envisage exceptions such as those outlined above. 
However, the immediate capacity to mobilise collateral proves more limited than that con-
tained in the regulations. An example of this occurred in late August when the New York Fed-
eral reserve, among other measures to tackle the sub-prime crisis, clarified the conditions for 
the eligibility of ABCP provided by counterparties that were providers of the liquidity facility of 
the vehicle in question. 
Beyond possible differences of opinion between the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve as 
to what constitutes close links, the foregoing example highlights the advantages of a system 
that is effectively extensive at all times. A wide-ranging collateral framework avoids two seri-
ous, practical difficulties of managing turbulent situations. First, it allows a situation of moral 
hazard resulting from having to take decisions to extend the list of eligible assets in situations 
of tension to be avoided. Further, it prevents the generation of spurious signals about the posi-
tion of institutions which, for whatever reason, find themselves having to resort to lending fa-
cilities. In sum, a sufficiently extensive and appropriately calibrated collateral framework is the 
best alternative both for normal and turbulent times. 
The entry into force of the new personal income tax legislation5 in January 2007 has entailed 
far-reaching changes in the taxation of, and withholdings system for, financial instruments. 
Among the main reforms enacted, mention should first be made of the replacement of the 
concept of “special income”6 with that of “savings income”, a different and broader term which, 
as can be seen in the accompanying table, covers all financial returns whatever the period over 
which they have been generated. Further, the different forms of taxation on income from mov-
able capital and on all existing capital gains and losses on the basis of issuers have been 
brought into line. In particular, the 40% reduction for income from movable capital generated 
at over two years, and the 40% and 75% reductions for returns at over two and five years on 
deferred capital insurance contracts if collection of the income is in the form of a single pay-
… allows for comfortable 
management of situations of 
tension, precluding the 
moral hazard stemming 
from taking decisions on the 
extension of the collateral 
list, and preventing the 
generation of spurious 
signals about the position of 
institutions which, for 
whatever reason, have to 
resort to the lending 
facilities.
3.2 Changes in the 
taxation of financial 
products
The new personal income 
tax legislation has enacted 
notable changes in the 
taxation of, and withholdings 
system for, financial 
instruments…
4. The capacity to obtain refinancing charged to collateral is restricted by the size of the haircuts applied to the face 
value of the collateralised asset. The size of this discount is determined by a combination of criteria which consider ex-
posure to risk in the event of enforcement of guarantees and the aim of neutrality in price formation on debt 
markets. 5. Law 35/2006 of 28 November 2006 on Personal Income Tax and the partial amendment of the legislation 
on Corporate and Non-Resident Income Tax and Wealth Tax (Official State Gazette of 29 November 2006). 6. The 
concept was introduced into Law 40/1998 on personal income tax and other tax regulations.
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ment, have been eliminated. The flat rate of 15% applied to special income is raised to 18%, 
and this rate is used for savings income irrespective of the taxpayer’s income level. The Royal 
Decree on payments on account7 has established a withholding of 18%, a 3 pp increase8.
As a result of all these changes, the dual tax system initiated in 1996 has been consolidated 
while the taxation of saving has become much more neutral in respect of instruments, terms 
and income levels. Accordingly, the current taxation of saving tends to foment greater compe-
tition among the issuers and managers of different financial instruments, strengthening the role 
of the terms of risk and return, while minimising tax considerations.
Recent developments in financial flows suggest that these changes may have influenced 
household portfolio decisions. Thus, since 2006 Q2 investment in this bank deposit sector 
— in which the lack of neutrality significantly affected the assets in question — has gained 
fresh momentum9.
… making the taxation of 
saving more neutral in 
respect of instruments, 
terms and income levels.
7. Royal Decree 1576/2006 of 22 December 2006 amending personal income tax regulations and other rules relating to 
payments on account. 8. For more details on this legislation and its effects, see the article (in Spanish only) by García-
Vaquero and Maza (2007): “El tratamiento de los instrumentos financieros en el nuevo IRPF”, Boletín Económico, 
January. 9. Although the new law did not come into force until 2007, investment in time deposits taken out during 2006 
and maturing in 2007 avails itself of the new tax arrangements.
FROM 2007
Long run
Less than 1 year
Between 1 and 2 
years
More than 2 years
Income
from
capital
Marginal rate 
reduction 40% (a)
Capital gains
and losses
Marginal rate
Income
from
work (c)
Marginal rate 
reduction 40%
Marginal rate
Short run
BEFORE 2007
All maturities
TYPE
OF INCOME
Marginal rate
15%
18% (b)
Marginal rate
SAVINGS TAX REFORM TABLE 3.1
General income Special income Saving income
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. In the case of insurance contracts, reductions may rise to 75 % if the investment 
period exceeds five years. There are reduced allocation percentages for temporary 
income and annuities.
b. In the case of temporary income and annuities, there are lower allocation 
percentages than in 2006.
c. Pensions plans and similar. Contributions are tax-deductible while benefits are taxed 
as income from work in the tax base.
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